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CASE SUMMARY
STATE V. TRUMP:
TRUMP FAILS IN THE ‘ART OF THE
DEAL’1 SECURING A VICTORY
FOR TRAVEL BAN 2.0
ELIZABETH MACAYAN*
INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court of Hawaii’s modifica-
tion of the preliminary injunction against sections 2 and 6 of President
Trump’s Executive Order 13780, in accordance with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project.2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 6, 2017, President Trump announced Executive Order
13780, “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the
United States.”3 Section 2 of the Order halts the entry of individuals from
the countries of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen into the
United States for ninety days.4 Section 6 halts for 120-days the entry of
refugees into the United States and decisions on refugee applicants.5
On March 15, 2017, the District Court of Hawaii issued a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) suspending sections 2 and 6 of the Executive
1 DONALD TRUMP WITH TONY SCHWARTZ, TRUMP: THE ART OF THE DEAL (2015).
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2018; B.A. Sociology,
University of California, Riverside, December 2004; Masters of Social Work, San Jose State
University, May 2008, Executive Research Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review.
2 State v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 2017).
3 Id. at 649-650.
4 Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (2017).
5 Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 C.F.R. § 6(a) (2017).
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Order, finding that the plaintiffs had successfully shown a likelihood of
success on the merits of their underlying Establishment Clause claim.6
On March 29, 2017, the district court issued a preliminary re-
straining order from the existing TRO enjoining the same sections of the
Executive Order from enforcement.7 On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part the preliminary injunction on statutory grounds rather
than the underlying constitutional question.8 The case was remanded
back to the District of Hawaii.9
The Government filed petitions for certiorari and applications to stay
the preliminary injunctions.10 On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and stayed the preliminary injunction in part, but only
to the extent that “the injunctions prevent enforcement of [section] 2(c)
with respect to foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States.”11 The Court defined bona
fide relationships in terms of “close familial relationships.”12
On June 29, 2017, the Government commenced enforcement of the
portions of the Executive Order not enjoined by the preliminary injunc-
tion.13 That same day, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion seeking
guidance from the district court as to the scope of the preliminary injunc-
tion, however the court denied the motion and referred the plaintiffs back
to the Supreme Court.14
On July 7, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the district court ruling and
again, the district court denied the motion.15 The plaintiffs then filed a
new motion, most notably seeking to modify the preliminary injunction
on the basis that “(1) the Government’s definition of ‘close familial rela-
tionship’ was artificially narrow and (2) refugees with a formal assurance
from a refugee settlement agency have a ‘bona fide relationship’ with a
U.S. entity.”16
On July 13, 2017, the district court granted the motion to enforce or
modify the preliminary injunction holding that the Government’s defini-
6 Trump, 871 F.3d at 650.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 651.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 652.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. The plaintiffs made additional contentions to the district court regarding clients of legal
services organizations and refugees in other programs, but for the purposes of this case summary
they have been omitted to focus on the court’s analysis of “close familial relationships” and refugees
with formal assurances.
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tion of “close familial relationships” was too narrow because it was lim-
ited to “parents, parents-in-law, spouses, fiance´s, children, adult sons and
daughters, sons- and daughters-in-law, siblings (half and whole relation-
ships), and step relationships.”17 The district court expanded the defini-
tion to include grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-
law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of individuals in the
United States.18 The district court also found that refugees with formal
assurance from resettlement agencies had bona fide relationships with a
United States entity.19
On July 14, 2017, the Government filed an appeal to the district
court’s order and a motion for a stay pending the appeal.20 Additionally,
the Government filed a motion for clarification to the Supreme Court
asking for further guidance regarding its stay issued on June 26, 2017
and requested a temporary administrative stay for the district court’s in-
junction.21 The Supreme Court denied the motion for clarification, but
issued a stay for the portion of the injunction “with respect to refugees
covered by a formal assurance.”22
On July 21, 2017, both parties filed a joint motion to expedite the
Government’s appeal, which the Ninth Circuit granted.23
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
The court’s analysis began with the Government’s argument that the
district court “significantly expand[ed] the preliminary injunction beyond
the limits of the stay.”24 In particular, the Government contended that the
district court committed error when they amended the preliminary in-
junction to prevent enforcement against: (1) certain family members,
such as grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law,
aunts, nieces, nephews, and cousins, and (2) refugees who received as-
surance from a U.S.-established resettlement agency.25
A. “CLOSE FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP” V. CERTAIN FAMILY MEMBERS
In its June 26, 2017 stay of the preliminary injunction, the Supreme
Court defined a bona fide relationship between individuals as a “close
17 Id. at 653.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 653.
21 Id. at 653-654.
22 Id. at 654.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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familial relationship,” and for entities, “the relationship must be formal,
documented and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the pur-
pose of evading [the Executive Order].”26 The Supreme Court further
defined the meaning of “close” familial relationship in terms of a “for-
eign national who wishes to enter the United States to live with or visit a
family member . . .” and pointed to the relationship between the plaintiff
and his mother-in-law as an example.27 The Supreme Court sought to
balance the equities between foreign nationals with no connections to the
United States and those possessing bona fide relationships with individu-
als in the United States where a hardship would be created if those per-
sons were denied entry.28
The Government claimed that it correctly interpreted the stay to in-
clude only the following relationships: parents, parents-in-law, spouses,
fiance´s, children, adult sons or daughters, sons- and daughters-in-law,
siblings, and step-relationships based on the Court’s definition of “close
familial relationships” in its stay order.29 The Government also main-
tained that it chose these particular relationships because of provisions in
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Supreme Court’s
use of the Executive Order’s case-by-case waivers.30
First, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Government did not cor-
rectly interpret the Supreme Court’s reference to “close familial relation-
ships” because they did not show how certain family members, such as
grandparents, grandchildren, brothers- and sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles,
nieces, nephews, and cousins, could have “no connection” to or “lack
any bona fide relationship” with individuals in the United States.31 The
court also reasoned that the Government did not clarify how the Execu-
tive Order would not burden other certain family members (grandparents,
grandchildren, brothers- and sisters-in-law) with “concrete hardships.”32
Second, the Ninth Circuit criticized the Government’s use of the
INA.33 The Government claimed that it based its list of familial relation-
ships on section 201 and section 203 of the INA.34 Section 201 defines
“immediate relatives” as “the children,” the “spouses, and parents of a
citizen of the United States.”35 Section 203 contains provisions for immi-
26 Id. at 651-52.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 651.
29 Id. at 655.
30 Id. at 655-56.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 656-57.
34 Id. at 656.
35 Id.
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grant visas in which certain individuals are prioritized: sons, daughters
and siblings of U.S. Citizens and spouses and unmarried sons and daugh-
ters of permanent resident aliens.36 In response, the court looked to the
Supreme Court’s focus on hardships placed on individuals in the United
States who had “bona fide relationships” with those foreign nationals
denied entry rather than specific INA definitions of family.37 Addition-
ally, the court commented on the Government’s unexplained “cherry-
pick[ing]” of INA definitions of “close familial relationships,” since
other provisions in the Act provide for broader definitions that include
close family as sisters- and brothers-in-law, grandparents, and
grandchildren.38
Third, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Government’s contention
that the Supreme Court’s positive use of the Executive Order’s waiver
provision supported their argument.39 In deciding to grant the stay, the
Court directed its attention to the case-by-case waivers designated in the
Executive Order in its balancing of equities.40 One particular waiver cov-
ers foreign nationals seeking “to enter the United States to visit or reside
with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent) who is a
United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or alien lawfully admit-
ted on a valid nonimmigrant visa [where] the denial of entry during the
suspension period would cause undue hardship.”41 Although that particu-
lar waiver specified some close family members, the Court reasoned that
that list was not exhaustive and the very existence of a waiver in the
Executive Order meant that there was a distinction between foreign na-
tionals with connections to the United States and those without.42
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s modification of the
preliminary injunction to include grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-
and sisters-in-law, aunts, nieces, nephews, and cousins.43
B. REFUGEES WHO HAVE RECEIVED FORMAL ASSURANCES FROM A
U.S.-ESTABLISHED RESETTLEMENT AGENCY
Next, the Government argued that the district court erred when it
modified the injunction to prevent its enforcement against refugees with
36 Id. at 655.
37 Id. at 656.
38 Id. at 657.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 649.
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formal assurances.44 In its June 26, 2017 stay order, the Supreme Court
held that if a refugee has a bona fide relationship with the United States
that is “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course rather
than to evade the Executive Order,” he or she is covered by the prelimi-
nary injunction.45 In contrast, the U.S Department of State declared that
“[t]he fact that a resettlement agency in the United States has provided a
formal assurance for a refugee seeking admission . . . is not sufficient in
and of itself to establish a qualifying relationship for that refugee with an
entity in the United States.”46 The Government argued that a formal as-
surance was not a relationship between the refugee and the resettlement
organization, but rather a relationship between the resettlement organiza-
tion and the Department of State.47
In response, the Ninth Circuit referred back to the Supreme Court’s
definition of a bona fide relationship with a U.S. entity holding that refu-
gees with formal assurances are excluded from the ban.48 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that formal assurances are given to refugees after they go
through a lengthy process consisting of an application and security and
medical screenings across multiple agencies.49 Only once a refugee has
completed this process do they receive “sponsorship assurance” from a
resettlement agency.50 Thus, the assurance and the underlying relation-
ship formed is “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course
rather than to evade the Executive Order.”51 Additionally, the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the fact that resettlement agencies would be subject to
“concrete hardships” in the form of a loss of invested resources and fi-
nancial support of the refugee, as well as an inability to fulfill their
agency missions, which are sometimes spiritual or religious, if the refu-
gee was denied entry.52
Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s modification of
the preliminary injunction to include refugees with formal assurances.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
Following its decision to affirm the district court’s modification of
the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit’s immediate concern was
44 Id. at 659.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 559.
49 Id. at 660.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 559.
52 Id. at 661-62.
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with the status of refugees in “vulnerable limbo” and the short time they
have before portions of their application for admittance into the United
States expire, particularly their security and medical checks.53 With this
in mind, the court shortened the time for the mandate to issue from 52-
days to five days.54
On September 24, 2017, Proclamation 9645 was announced, barring
entry of foreign nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen,
Somalia, Venezuela, and North Korea.55 The U.S. District Courts of Ha-
waii and Maryland issued injunctions against the ban of nationals from
all aforementioned countries, except Venezuela and North Korea.56
Some lawyers have argued against national injunctions because of
their greater implications.57 In particular, national injunctions were used
during the Obama and Bush administrations to block the enforcement of
certain executive orders, statutes, and regulations.58 Thus, concerns arise
from the use of forum shopping to find the most sympathetic court that
will issue the injunction.59 An example of this is the use of the Ninth
Circuit’s liberal reputation to block Trump’s Executive Order.60 Other
implications include the lack of “percolation” among lower courts before
the Supreme Court hears the issue, whereby several courts and circuits
decide on the case before it reaches the Supreme Court, and the federal
courts’ lack of judicial authority, which does not allow for the resolution
of all issues for the parties.61 Instead this authority is laid out in the U.S.
Constitution as being delegated to the Supreme Court and the lower
courts, who hold judicial power and the ability to “decide particular cases
for particular parties.”62
Despite the existing injunctions against the President’s most recent
Proclamation, the country continues to struggle with how to deal with
53 Id. at 664.
54 Id.
55 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24. 2017).
56 NAFSA: Association of International Educators, Executive Order Entry Ban Litigation Up-
dates (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.nafsa.org/Professional_Resources/Browse_by_Interest/Interna-
tional_Students_and_Scholars/Executive_Order_Entry_Ban_Litigation_Updates/.
57 Samuel Bray, The Case Against National Injunctions, No Matter Who Is President,
LAWFARE (Feb. 4, 2017, 4:00pm), https://www.lawfareblog.com/case-against-national-injunctions-
no-matter-who-president.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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terrorism, foreign nationals, and refugees. It is likely that the Govern-
ment will appeal the existing injunctions63 and the saga will continue.
63 NAFSA: Association of International Educators, Executive Order Entry Ban Litigation Up-
dates (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.nafsa.org/Professional_Resources/Browse_by_Interest/Interna-
tional_Students_and_Scholars/Executive_Order_Entry_Ban_Litigation_Updates/.
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